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Introduction 
In 2007 the NESC completed an in-depth assessment to identify, define and 
document engineering considerations for the Design Development Test and 
Evaluation (DDT&E) of human-rated spacecraft systems 
- Requested by the Astronaut Office at JSC to help them to better understand what is 
required to ensure safe, robust, and reliable human-rated spacecraft systems 
The 22 GN&C engineering Best Practices described in this paper are a condensed 
version of what appears in the NESC Technical Report 
These Best Practices cover a broad range from fundamental system architectural 
considerations to more specific aspects (e.g., stability margin recommendations) 
of GN&C system design and development 
15 of the Best Practices address the early phases of a GN&C System development 
project and the remaining 7 deal with the later phases. 
- Some of these Best Practices will cross-over between both phases. 
Recognize that this set of GN&C Best Practices will not be universally applicable 
to all projects and mission applications 
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Motivation: Common GN&C Pitfalls 
GN&C Related Worldwide Launch Vehicle Failures 
Over the ten vear ~ e r i o d  of 1996 to 2006. 
I rn 
21 out of the 773 launch attempts worldwide, 
experienced a known GN&C anomaly 
- 15 resulted in a catastrophic launch failure 
Approximately one-third (15) of all 52 
catastrophic launch failures worldwide over 
this ten year period were GN&C-related 
Design flaws identified as largest (40%) 
single cause of GN&C-related catastrophic 
launch failures (6 out of 15) 
Avionics and Flight - --- " ~ h  ~ I I  
Software were equally 
large (20%) failure 930h 
causes at the I I 
component level I 
I Faikd Launches, NowGNeC I 
GN&C Related NASA Spacecraft Failures 
Over the ten year period of 1996 to 2006'38% (30 out of 79) of 
all NASA spacecraft experienced a known GN&C anomaly 
8% of all NASA experienced a catastrophic satellite failure over 
this same time period 
50% of catastrophic GN&C anomalies occurred within 10% of 
the satellite's design life 
Largest contributing causes of 
catastrophic GN&C anomalies were: 
- Design (33%) 
- Software (33%) 
- Operational (17%) 
Motivation for The NESC Best Practices 
The primary motivation of this presentation is to provide useful guidance, in 
the form of these Best Practices, to the synthesis and operation of GN&C 
systems for NASA's future human-rated spacecraft. 
The GN&C Best Practice information contained in NESC Technical Report is 
also intended to provide: 
- Insights for non-GN&C engineers and managers 
- Tutorial-type guidance for fresh-out GN&C engineers 
- A useful memory aid for more experienced GN&C engineers especially as a 
checklist for technical evaluation and review of a GN&C system. 
A secondary motivation of this presentation is to invite feedback on this initial 
set of Best Practices from the NASA Program Management community 
- In particular, we solicit other specific GN&C Lessons Learned that NESC should 
capture based on either crewed and robotic flight system project experiences 
GN&C Interacts With and is Influenced by Virtually All 
Other Spacecraft Subsystems 
"...we cannot do just one thing. Whether we like it 
or not, whatever we do has multiple effects." 
Dietrich Domer, author of the Logic of Failure, 
commenting on the topic of complex systems 
"In space systems, most dynamic problems 
do not occur in one isolated discipline, 
but are an interaction between several 
disciplines or subsystems" 
Bob Ryan, author of "Problems Experienced and 
Envisioned for Dynamical Physical Systems1", 
commenting on his Apollo, Skylab, and Space 
Shuttle career experiences at NASA 
Consider: How do faults in other subsystems affect GN&C? 
NASA Document TP-2508, August 1985 10 
Common GN&C DDT&E Pitfalls (1 of 2) 
Poor or Missing GN&C Requirements 
Failure to Stop Requirements Creep 
Poor Characterization of Mission Operational Regimes & Environments 
Unknown or Poorly Defined Interactions 
Unknown or Poorly Defined Interfaces 
Poorly Defined Coordinate Frames and System of Units 
Unknown and/or Incorrectly Modeled Dynamics 
Feedback Control System Instabilities due to Large Model Uncertainties 
Reliance on Any "Heritage": in the Hardware, Software, Design Team, etc. 
Reliance on low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) GN&C technologies 
Sensor/Actuator Component Degradation & Failure 
Insufficient On-Board Processing Capability for GN&C Flight Software (FSW) Algorithms 11 
Common GN&C DDT&E Pitfalls (2 of 2) 
4 lnadequate Systems Engineering for Coordinated GN&C of Multiple Interacting Vehicles 
(e.g., during Rendezvous and Docking) 
J Poor GN&C Fault Management Strategy 
J Lack of Comprehensive Abort Strategy 
J lnadequate "Safe Haven" capabilities 
J Failure to "Design for Test" 
J Failure to "Test as You Fly and Fly as You Test" 
J Inadequate Hardware In The Loop (HITL) End-to-End Testing to Verify Proper Operations 
J lnadequate Sensor-to-Actuator Polarity Tests (Lack of End-to-End Testing) 
J Unresolved Test Anomalies & Discrepancies 
J No truly independent Verification and Validation (V & V) process for GN&C 
J Failure to Have Crew and Operations Team "Train as You Fly" 
4 lnadequate ValidationICertification of GN&C Ground Data and Tools 
Insufficient Telemetry for GN&C Performance Monitoring and Anomaly Resolution During 
Launch, Early Orbit Checkout & All Mission Critical Events 
Motivation for The NESC Best Practices 
An examination of the historical record reveals that several GN&C systems 
have been seriously victimized by one of more of the pitfalls listed above 
either during their design, development, test or operational phases. 
It appears that many previously established Lessons Learned must be 
relearned by the community. 
The continued repetition of the same GN&C mistakes represents an 
avoidable risk to crew safety and mission success. 
If rigorously followed these GN&C Best Practices will help protect against 
the pitfalls cited above. 
Bear in mind however that these GN&C Best Practices will not be 
universally applicable to all projects and mission applications. 
These Best Practices alone are not a substitute for sound engineering 
judgment, experience, expertise, attention to day-to-day details, and 
intellectual curiosity. 
Motivation for The NESC Best Practices 
Two Representative Examples Where Breakdowns in 
the Application of the GN&C Best Practices Occurred 
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center Photo Collaction 
http:llwww.~.~sa.gov/galIwyIphotolindex.html 
NASA Photo: EC01-0182-11 Date: June 2.2001 Photo by: Jim Ross 
The X43AIPegasus combination dmpped into the Pacific Ocean after lasing wntrol earn in the first 
free-flight attempt. 
X-43A I Pegasus Launch June 2,2001 Ariane 5 Flight 501 June 4, 1996 
14 
1 Some Key GN&C System Considerations for I 
Human-Rated Spacecraft 
Human Spaceflight Heritage 
Significant GN&C Related Anomalies on Crewed Spacecraft 
Progress M-7 March 1991 
Failed "On" thruster causes miss encounter with Mir space 
vehicle to tumble; crew uses re- station due to Kurs radar damage Oxygen tank explosion forces 
crew into LM "Lifeboat" and 
I I STS-91 June 1991 necessitates manual T M I  1 LM tumbles while in low lunar orbit: 
- - ~  ~ 
STS-9 NOV 1983 alignment transfer process IMU gimbal lock narrowly avoided Primary Avionics during attitude recovery by crew 
GPC failures during Software System (PASS) 
Abort to Orbit performed deorbit, entry and landing corrupted by GPS errors 
follow~ng a premature 5. - '  
- .  
SSME shutdown dunng * -  I/ 1 
ascent due to false englne 4%: * ;yd. Z -. >..\ L4 
< > ( < '  
'tV 
Soyuz 18-1 April 1975 Progress M-34 June 1997 
. . . 
F~rst high altitude abort of a -/- 
/ 
Coll~ded w~th Mlr 
crewed spacecraft when 2* 
stage fails to separate from 3d Control Moment Gyro 
stage of booster; crew survives STS-3 March 1982 STS-1 April 1981 
Orbiter flight control and robotic arm Unmodeled vernier thruster  
, I Apollo 12 Nov 1969 
Soyuz T-1OA Sept 1983 Saturn-v booster struck 
First pad abort of a crewed by lighting; IMU in 
spacecraft after pad fire, crew Command Module 
survives 17 g Launch Escape tumbles & crew looses 
attitude reference 
systems dynamically interact causes plume impingement causes 
unexpectedly high vemier thruster greatly increased duty cycles 
duty cycles and propellant consumption  
Soyuz Ballistic Re-Entries 
I Soyuz 33 April 1979 10 g's I 
I Soyuz TMA-I May 2003 8 g's Soyuz TMA-I0 Oct 2007 9 g's 
LM guidance computer overloaded 
Faulty LM abort mode switch 
I STS-3 March 1982 I 
I Handling Qualities/PIO I 
Some Observations on 
Significant Human Space Flight Vehicle Failures 
Several significant GN&C anomalies have occurred on-orbit 
Anomalies can occur at any time: on the launch pad, during ascent, on- 
orbit, entry, decent andlor landing 
In failure cases other than ascent and reentry the crew had time evaluate, 
troubleshoot, and respond to on-orbit failures (e.g., Apollo 13) 
It can be inferred that spacecraft robustness precluded a number of 
significant failures from becoming catastrophic 
One notable statistic: With the exception of the Apollo-1 cabin fire, the 
loss of human life has only occurred during ascent and reentry which are 
the two most dynamic phases of the mission 
During high risklhighly dynamic mission phases it is important to include 
response time and automation into the redundancy and backup 
spacecraft reliability trades 
The different aspects of all mission phases must be considered when 
selecting spacecraft architectures and when deciding where to buy down 
risks 
Some Key GN&C System Considerations 
for Human-Rated Spacecraft 
Take time to properly architect the GN&C System(s) 
- Directly impacts crew safety, mission success, 
upgradeability & Life Cycle costs 
- Flowdown requirements for Rendezvous, Proximity 
Operations, Docking and Undocking (RPODU) 
- Carefully consider redundancy using identical vs. 
diverse HIW and SIW components 
Minimize complexity where possible 
- Impacts reliability, testability, and operability, as 
well as any potential vehicle GN&C commonality 
Have robust abort strategies and reliable Safe- 
Haven capabilities 
- Absolutely need a simple "Never Give Up" Safe 
Haven mode able to return crew safely to Earth 
Carefully evaluate the costlbenefit trade for 
heritage hardware and software Flight-Like Cockpit Mockups 
- Recall Shuttle experience with tactical aircraft (such as MlTllL Apollo Hybrid 
inertial systems, GPS receivers, and processors Simulator) Allowed Apollo 
"Train as You Fly" Astronauts Hands-on Training 
- Factor in early the crew feedback on GN&C Which Influenced the GN&C 
architecture, human-machine interface, and 
operational procedures Design 19 
NESCYs 22 GN&C Best Practices 
15 for "Early Work" 
7 for "Late Work" 
List of the NESC 15 Early Work GN&C Best Practices 
1 Early and iterative GN&C subsystem architectural development 
2 Define all GN&C interdisciplinary interactions and relationships 
3 Ensure implementation of comprehensive AbortlSafe Haven 
strategieslfunctions 
4 Adequacy of host computer and proper selection of execution frequencies 
5 Independent hardware and software for GN&C fault management 
6 Establish & flowdown GN&C requirements for multi-vehicle system 
7 Evaluate redundancy with identical GN&C hardware components 
8 Evaluate heritage hardware and software in the GN&C architecture 
9 Make certain that new GN&C technology is well qualified 
10 "Design for Test" when evaluating candidate GN&C architectures 
11 Define and document the coordinate frames and the system of units 
12 Controller designs shall have robust stability margins 
13 Understand & completely analyze the dynamics in ALL flight phases 
14 All test anomalies must be understood and may need to be included in the 
truth model 
15 Verification Truth Model must be developed independently 
List of the NESC 7 Late Work GN&C Best Practices 
- 
16 Establish a strong relationship with, and maintain close surveillance of GN&C 
lower-tier component-level suppliers 
17 Adhere to the "Test As You Fly" philosophy 
18 Conduct true end-to-end sensors-to-actuators polarity tests in all flight 
configurations 
19 Plan and conduct sufficient GN&C hardware-in-the-loop testing to verify proper 
interactions 
20 Carefully manage GN&C ground databases, uploads, ground application tools, 
and command scripts I files 
21 Ensure sufficiency of GN&C engineering telemetry data 
22 "Train as They Fly": Develop a dedicated real-time GN&C simulator for the 
crewloperators 
Reference: 
Each of the 22 NESC GN&C Best Practice listed above is described 
in detail in the AIAA technical paper AIAA-2007-6336, entitled 
"GN& C Engineering Best Practices for Hunan-Rated Spacecraft Systems", 
dated August 2007, by DennehylLebsocWWest 
Discussion of Best Practices 
I vs. I 
Real-World Mishaps I 
Top-Level Summary of the M-34 Mishap 
Progress-M spacecraft is an unmanned cargo and 
resupply vehicle used to send equipment to Mir. 
On 6/25\97 a2nd test was performed of the manual 
Toru proximity docking system as a lower cost 
substitute for the autonomous Kurs rendezvous 
and docking system. 
+ Operator on Mir had difficulty determining range 
and range rate with the Kurs radar switched off. 
Progress went off course and collided with a solar 
array and radiator on the Spektr module and then 
the module itself. 
Spektr hull was breached causing significant air 
loss before Spektr module could be sealed off. 
Evacuation of the station was narrowly avoided. 
There were three immediate causes of the crash: 
- The higher than planned initial closing rate 
- Late realization that closing rate was too high 
- Incorrect final avoidance maneuvering 
Root Causes of the M-34 Mishap vs. 
NESC GN&C Best Practices 
1. Range was to be determined by observing the size of a video image of Mir 
taken by a camera on Progress. The sole source of range rate information was 
the changing angular size and position of the image. 
BP it9: The mte measurement scheme was not qualified. 
BP # 5 :  No independeit: t w j t  v:ss ,xdovided to derennine a fairlr if7 the n:e 
meas iiref-iif317;. 
2. The operator continued to maneuver and aim for the docking port after 
noticing that the closing rate was higher than expected. 
BP #I 4 : Failure to explain test anomalies. 
3. Post crash simulations show that the rendezvous trajectory was passively 
safe so that if the operator had stopped maneuvering in time the collision 
might have been avoided. 
BP #6: Pre-rest Systems Engineering did not flow down appropriate 
requirements to insure the safe interaction between rhe vehicies . 
4. The operator could not realistically train and rehearse the rendezvous in 
advance because there were no simulation training facilities onboard Mir. 
BP #22: There was no provision to "Train as They Fly ". 
Top-Level Summary of the LEWIS Mishap 
LEWIS was launched on August 23,1997 into low Earth Orbit. 
1. At launch, LEWIS was under control of the A-side 
processor. At first contact it had already switched 
to the B-side and was unable to playback SSR 
data. 
After 45 hours of nadir pointing on B-side, the 
Ground crew switched control back to the A-side. 
The attitude was uncontrolled so the A-side Sun 
pointing mode was entered. 
After verifying that the spacecraft had been stable 
in the Sun mode for four hours of operation, the 
Ground crew entered a nine-hour rest period and 
ceased operations for the day. 
During that unattended period, the spacecraft 
entered a flat spin that resulted in a loss of solar 
power and a fatal battery discharge. Contact with 
the spacecraft was lost on August 26. 
5. The spacecraft re-entered the atmosphere and was 
destroyed on 28 September 1997. 
Root Causes of the LEWIS Mishap vs. 
NESC GN&C Best Practices 
1. Safe mode was adapted from the TOMS spacecraft which had its X-axis normal to 
the solar array. X was the major axis of inertia on TOMS but it was the intermediate 
axis of inertia on Lewis. 
B P #8: Over-reliance/Over-Con fidence on TOMS heritage. 
BP #I : GN&C Safe mode architectural was not iterated. 
2. X-axis spin rate was not sensed and could not be controlled. 
B P #3: Ensure implementation of comprehensive A bort/Safe Haven 
stra tegies/functions. 
3. The Ground crew failed to adequately monitor spacecraft health and safety during 
the critical initial mission phase. 
BP #2 1 : Ensure sufficiency of GN&C engineering telemetry data. 
4. X-axis rate produced disturbance torques in other axes resulting in excessive 
thruster firings which led to autonomous shutdown of thrusters. 
BP #I 3: Understand & completely analyze the dynamics in ALL flight phases. 
5. In the absence of control, the spacecraft dynamics transferred spin from the X to the 
Z axis with the solar array edge on to the Sun. 
BP #I 5: Independent Truth Model should have identified un-modeled effects. 
Top-Level Summary of the X-31A Mishap 
The X-31 program demonstrated the value 
of Thrust Vector Control (TVC) coupled with 
advanced flight control systems, to provide 
controlled flight during close-in air combat 
at very high angles of attack. 
The final flight of the X-31A was through 
atmospheric conditions conducive to icing. 
The flight went as planned until an ice buildup 
blocked the pitot tube. 
The Flight Computer used invalid air speed 
data to generate attitude control commands. 
Inappropriate commands resulted in 
uncontrollableldivergent pitch oscillations. 
The pilot ejected at 18,000 ft. and parachuted to the ground. 
A NASA mishap-investigation board concluded that an accumulation of ice in or 
on the unheated pitot-static system was the proximate cause of the crash. 
Underlying Issues included: 
-Incomplete/improper interpretation of hazards analysis 
-Breakdown in configuration management and change documentation 
-Failure to impose proper ops controls and take preventative action 28 
Root Causes of the X-31A Mishap vs. 
NESC GN&C Best Practices 
1. The decision to install a new airspeed probe without a heater assumed that no 
flights would be made through conditions conducive to icing. The test pilot was 
unaware that the pitot heater switch was not working. 
BP #lo:  Failure to design for test. 
BP #20: Failure to coordinate information on potential hazard due to change 
in configuration. 
2. Spurious air speed readings were noticed as ice built up and pilot switched ON the 
inoperative heater. Control room debated and finally replied that heater "...may not 
be hooked up" 9 seconds before warning tone and master caution light came on. 
BP #14: Failure to explain test anomalies. 
3. When the Flight control computers received erroneous airspeed inputs, flight 
control gains changed so drastically that the pilot could not maintain control. 
BP #I 2: Insufficient control system stability margins. 
CP 2: 3: Lack o f  parametric uncertainty analysis for control system. 
4. 'Fall-back' fixed gain reversion modes were available for such situations, but had 
not been practiced and the pilot had not been briefed on their potential use in the 
event of unreliable airspeed data. 
BP #3: Abort/Safe Haven strategy (Reversion Mode) was not utilized. 
5. Data from alternate air speed indicator that used a different pitot tube was ignored. 
BP #7: Independent air speed sensor data was available but not utilized, 29 
Top-Level Summary of the ARIANE-5 Flight 501 Mishap 
The maiden flight of the Ariane 5 launcher on June 4, 1996 relied on identical GN&C 
hardware and software for redundancy. 
39 seconds into the flight the primary Inertial 
Reference Unit (SRI-1) stopped sending correct 
attitude data due to a software exception. 
The On-Board Computer (OBC) switched to the 
backup inertial unit, but SRI-2 also failed due to 
its independently determined (but identical) 
software exception. 
The OBC could not switch back to SRI-I so it 
took data that was actually part of a diagnostic 
message written to the bus by SRI-2. This data 
was interpreted as flight data and used for 
thrust vector control. 
The sudden swivelling of both solid booster 
nozzles up to the limit caused the launcher to 
tilt sharply giving rise to intense aerodynamic 
loads leading to destruction of the vehicle. 
Root Causes of the ARIANE-5 Flight 501 Mishap vs. 
NESC GN&C Best Practices 
1. Primary Inertial Reference Unit, SRI-1, stopped sending correct attitude data due to 
a software exception. 
BP #2: Interactions between SMIand GN&C were not defined with enough 
care. 
BP #8: Heritage software for Ariane-4 was inappropriate for Ariane-5. 
BP #20: Database confusion over reference trajectories. 
BP #17: Failure to adhere to "Test as You Fly" approach. 
2. Switchover to the backup unit was accomplished, but SRI-2 immediately failed in the 
same way as SRI-1. 
BP # 7: Evaluate if redundancy using identical GN&C components increases 
or decreases reliability. 
3. The OBC could not switch back to SRI-1 so it accepted SRI-2 diagnostic data as 
attitude data and generated improper TVC commands. 
BP #3: Ensure that A bort/Safe Haven strategies/functions are properly 
implemented. Ariane-5 was lacking a simple and reliable "Never Give Up" 
flight control capability. 
Observations & Summary 
Observations 
Complex space systems can produce flight articles that 
have a high sensitivity to parameter variations and 
reduced margins of stability and safety 
The ways humans approach complex design andlor 
operational problems, and fail to solve them, is often 
because of an inability to think systemically 
This is critically important for the GN&C subsystem which 
interacts with virtually all the other subsystems on the 
flight article 
Lessons are being documented but not being "learned" 
One needs to not only carefully designltest all the new 
system capabilities functions but also make sure the 
previously established capabilities are implemented 
correctly 33 
Summary 
This presentation has introduced the initial set of the NESC GN&C Best 
Practices for review and comment by the Program Management 
community 
The NESC GN&C Technical Discipline Team (TDT) is initiating a "GN&C 
Guidelines Project" to: 
- expand and build upon the work done to date 
- to more formally document and distribute a comprehensive set of Agency- 
wide GN&C System development guidelines 
We welcome and solicit constructive feedback from the Program 
Management community as we go forward with this activity 
Call Neil Dennehy at NASAIGSFC on 301-286-5696 (or e-mail at 
cornelius.j.dennehv@nasa.gov) with your: 
- Comments 
- Questions 
- Experiences 
- Inputs 
Backup 
Top-Level Summary of the X-43A Mishap 
The HXLV (Pegasus) was used to 
accelerate the Hyper-X Research Vehicle 
I 
(HXRV) to the required Mach number and 
operational altitude for demonstration. 
The trajectory that was selected to 
achieve the mission was at a lower 
altitude (i.e. a higher dynamic pressure) 
than a typical Pegasus trajectory. 
Flight went as planned after B-52 drop m 
until pitch-up maneuver. 
Dil:crging roll oscillation at 2.5-Hz frequency occurred during pitch-up. 
Eo!l oscillation continued to diverge until about 13 seconds into flight. 
Rudder electro-mechanical actuator stalled & ceased to respond to autopilot at 
that point causing loss of yaw control. 
Loss of yaw control caused X-43A stack sideslip to diverge rapidly to over 8 O .  
Structural overload of starboard elevon occurred at 13.5 sec. 
Loss of control caused X-43A stack to deviate significantly from planned 
trajectory. 
Vehicle terminated by range control about 49 sec. after release. 36 
Root Causes of the X-43A Mishap vs. 
NESC GN&C Best Practices 
1. The vehicle control system design was deficient for the trajectory flown due to 
inaccurate analytical models which overestimated design margins. 
BP #8: Over-reliance/Over-Confidence on Pegasus heritage. 
BP #I 7:  Failure to adhere to "Test as You Fly" approach. 
2. Failure triggered by divergent roll oscillatory motion at 2.5 Hz, caused by excessive 
control system gain. 
BP #I 2: Insufficient control system stability margins. 
3. Modeling inaccuracies in fin actuation system & aerodynamics. Insufficient 
variations of modeling parameters. 
BP #I 3: Lacking parametric uncertainty analysis for control system. 
4. R ~ 2 2 e r  actua:ci- st;:! occurred as consequence of divergent roll which accelerated 
loss of control. 
BP #I 4: Inadequate dynamic modeling. 
5. Flight failure was only reproduced when all modeling inaccuracies with uncertainty 
variations were incorporated in system-level linear analysis model & nonlinear 
simulation model. 
BP #I 5: Independent Truth Model should have identified un-modeled effects. 
Top-Level Summary of the TIMED Mishap 
The Thermosphere, Ionosphere, Mesosphere, 
Energetics and Dynamics (TIMED) spacecraft was 
launched on 7 December 2001 into low Earth orbit. 
There were 4 separate GN&C anomalies early in 
the mission: 
1. Shortly after separation there was a steady 
increase in spacecraft system momentum. 
2. Coming out of eclipse and seeing the Sun for 
first time in Sun Pointing Mode, the spacecraft 
pointed an incorrect axis toward the Sun. 
3. The Nadir Pointing Mode, which is used for 
2;:;,1c; ~Lsir\~;tions, h;d an unanticipated 2.1 
oscillation. 
the 
Hz 
4. Momentum dumping occurred 10 timeslday 
rather than the expected oncelday. 
Root Causes of the TIMED Mishap vs. 
NESC GN&C Best Practices 
1. There was a Sign Error in the Momentum Unloading Control Logic. 
BP #I 8: True end-to-end sensors-to-actuators polarity tests not conducted. 
2. Two of the Sun Sensors were not in the flight configuration during ACS polarity test. 
BP #I?: "Test As You Fly" philosophy was not enforced. 
3. There was a Controls-Structures Interaction (CSI) with the Solar Array Flex Mode 
which varied from 2.0-2.6 Hz depending on array orientation. 
BP #2: Interactions between GN&C, Power, and Structures were not  well 
defined, 
BP #12: Stability margins were not robust to parameter variations. 
4. The Spacecraft had a 10 A-m2 Residual Magnetic Dipole. 
BP #2: Residual dipole requirement was not specified. 
C? %': IZC!~:~! d,:?c!-. rvss nct measured in ground test. 
